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Business cycle models seek to answer the question of why economies go through cycles
of recession and recovery, or boom and bust. Any theory of the business cycle makes two sorts
of claims: what shocks are most important in disturbing the economy and what economic
structure is necessary for propagating these shocks. For example, one common explanation of
business cycles begins with monetary shocks, and then seeks to explain why monetary shocks
are not purely neutral, as neoclassical theory would have it, and instead have real effects, at least
in the short term. Early models in this vein were often implicitly or explicitly based on the
proposition that markets do not clear continuously.  Early equilibrium "real business cycle"
theories instead emphasized the importance of real shocks, especially to technology, which may
cause socially efficient fluctuations even when markets are always in equilibrium. More recent
models have attempted to marry the equilibrium approach to macroeconomics with the
substantive Keynesian ideas that money is not neutral and that economic fluctuations are costly.
New Keynesian theories of the business cycle admit the possibility of a number of economic
shocks, including monetary and technology shocks, but then focus on explaining how nominal
price rigidities within the economy can turn these shocks into recessions or booms. Other models
show that business cycles driven by Keynesian "animal spirits" are consistent with rigorous
microfoundations and rational expectations
Seeking empirical evidence for and against these various approaches, we turn business
cycle theories loose on perhaps the greatest macroeconomic laboratory available: the extant
record of macroeconomic historical statistics for a broad cross-section of countries since the late
19th century. We have annual time-series data running from circa 1870 to the present on output,
prices, real wages, exchange rates, total consumption (public plus private), investment, and the
current account for 15 countries.
1 Over this time frame, this is the largest such panel of data ever
studied in terms of country coverage.
We will further focus our discussion by dividing the last 130 years into four time periods
that, not coincidentally, echo the usual division of this time frame into four distinct international
                    
1. The countries are: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan,
Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.  This empirical approach is an
extension of Backus and Kehoe (1992). We owe many debts to scholars who helped us collate the data,
especially Michael Bordo.  Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) performed a similar exercise; unlike
them, we also examine the cyclicality of real wages, drawing on the historical real wage database
assembled by Williamson (1995, and more recent revisions). For more details of the data so assembled
see Obstfeld and Taylor (1999). A summary of the data sources is contained in a longer, working-paper
version of the present article. That paper, and the data, are available upon request from the authors.2
monetary regimes (Eichengreen, 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1999). The first period from about
1870 up to 1914, represents the time when much of the world economy worked according to the
classical gold standard. This system was for most countries a stable and credible regime,
characterized by fixed exchange rates and monetary discipline, and it facilitated the integration
of global capital markets (Eichengreen, 1996; Eichengreen and Flandreau, 1996; Bordo and
Kydland, 1995; Bordo and Rockoff, 1996; Edelstein, 1982).  In the second period, from 1919 to
1939,
2 this well-integrated global economy was destroyed; it went from globalized to almost
autarkic in the space of a few decades. Capital controls became widespread, capital flows were
minimal, and international investment was regarded with suspicion (Eichengreen, 1992; Temin,
1989). In the third period, the Bretton Woods era from 1945 to 1971, an attempt to rebuild the
global economy took shape, and global trade and capital flows increased. However, exchange
rates remained largely fixed by international treaty and the design of the International Monetary
Fund allowed capital controls as a means for governments to prevent currency crises and runs,
and to provide scope for activist monetary policy (Bordo and Eichengreen, 1993; Eichengreen,
1996). The fourth period, the era of floating exchange rates, has lasted from the early 1970s to
the present. Floating rates meant that capital controls were no longer needed: shifts in market
sentiment now resulted in exchange rate shifts rather than pressure for a flow of capital (Obstfeld
and Rogoff, 1995; Eichengreen, 1996; IMF, 1997). This generally encouraged the integration of
capital markets, although important setbacks to that global movement of capital were seen in the
developing economy debt crisis of the early 1980s and in the emerging markets financial crises
of 1997–98. 
Dividing the time period according to these monetary regimes represents our judgement
that although goods and labor markets evolved too, the change in capital mobility probably
deserves the greatest scrutiny as a factor affecting business cycle fluctuations. Indeed, such a
focus on capital-market shocks dominates most of the specialist literature just as it does most
popular writing—past and present—discussing the impact of the global economy on local
economies in crisis or depression
A variety of historical data strongly support the division of economic history into these
four segments (Obstfeld and Taylor, 1999, ch. 2).  For example, from 1870 to 1914, the average
size of international capital flows in our 15 countries, as measured by current account deficits,
                    
2. We omit both World Wars from our sample.3
was often as high as 4-5 percent of national income before World War I. Foreign assets rose
from 7 percent of world GDP in 1870 to just under 20 percent in the years from 1900–14. As
global capital markets integrated, interest rates in different countries clustered at similar levels.
During the period from 1919-1939, international capital flows diminished in the 1920s and were
typically less than 2 percent of national income in the late 1930s. Foreign assets were only 8
percent of world output by 1930 and just 5 percent in 1945. As global capital markets
disintegrated, the dispersion of real interest rates doubled in the 1920s (Lothian, 1985). During
the third period, from 1945 through the 1960s, the size of international capital flows declined to
an all-time low, around 1 percent of national income. Only during the floating exchange rate
period of the late 1970s and 1980s have international capital flows increased, although the
annual flows are still not yet to levels comparable to those of a century ago. Today, gross foreign
assets have risen again, to about 50 percent of world GDP.  As global capital markets have
stabilized and reintegrated, the dispersion of real interest rates has returned to its pre-1914 levels.
Thus, our approach in this paper is to see what an international and historical perspective
has to say about the sources and structures of business cycles. One advantage of this approach is
that a robust and useful theory of business cycles should be able to account for the patterns seen
in the long-run data for many countries. This ought to be a more discriminating test than, say,
applying one theory to selected years for one country. Moreover, the division into four different
time periods does not just reflect the obvious differences in monetary regimes—each regime also
restricts the set of possible economic shocks and propagation mechanisms while allowing others,
and thus affects the behavior of many non-monetary economic variables over the business cycle.
The analysis of business cycles at the global level forces us to confront the open-economy
extensions of all the theories and the extent to which such theories can then fit into the historical
record of an evolving global economy.
We will not seek to build up a particular model of business cycles and then strive to
defend it. Instead, we will search for regularities in the historical and international data in an
attempt to whittle down the set of acceptable business cycle models. Our empirical evidence
starts with a look at the behavior of the macroeconomic aggregates during the four time
periods—like income, consumption, investment, the current account, and the price level—both
as a way of becoming acquainted with the data and to address the question of whether business
cycles have become less volatile over time. We then lay out a set of issues on which business
cycle theory must take a stand and then examine cross-country data from several historical4
periods that point to some answers. We explore evidence that monetary shocks are not neutral in
their effect on the economy, and then consider whether this is because nominal prices, or wages,
are slow to adjust. We consider whether the labor market clears, at least to a first approximation,
and find somewhat ambivalent results. We then debate whether we can continue to think of
business cycles in closed-economy settings, or if the explanations of the sources of economic
shocks and the structures that may propagate them are more plausibly explored in an open-
economy model.  Finally, based on these discussions of the characteristics of business cycles, we
offer some preliminary thoughts about what sorts of business cycle models we believe will offer
the most fertile approach for future research.
Patterns of Macroeconomic Aggregates
The first major question in all historical accounts of the evolution of the business cycle is
whether the cycle has become more or less volatile over time. Controversy has raged over
whether the postwar period has witnessed a diminution of volatility, perhaps reflecting
institutional developments and the successful application of macro-management policies, or
whether the business cycles across nations are no less volatile than they were during the late 19th
century. Some of this debate has been focused on U.S. business cycles, as discussed by Christina
Romer in her contribution to this symposium. For international and historical evidence, the
interested reader might begin with Backus and Kehoe (1992) and Bergman, Bordo and Jonung
(1998). Interpretations of the historical international evidence are complicated by the fact that
they use annual data, rather than higher frequency data, which makes it hard to measure the
length of cycles accurately. Moreover, the sample size, as measured by the number of business
cycles that has occurred, remains relatively small.
One simple way to look at economic volatility is to compare the standard deviation of
key economic variables during various time periods. This information is presented in the first
five rows of Table 1.
3 If one pools the data for the 15 countries during each of the four time
                    
3. Following recent practice, we detrend all our series as necessary using a bandpass filter that is designed
to isolate fluctuations at business-cycle frequencies: those lasting between 2 to 8 years. See Baxter and
King (1995) for details, and for a comparison with the usual Hodrick-Prescott filter. They argue that the
bandpass filter has more desirable transfer properties for the isolation of specific business-cycle
frequencies in the data. It is the filter used by Stock and Watson (1998) and Bergman, Bordo, and Jonung
(1998). In contrast, the Hodrick-Prescott filter used in earlier studies passes much of the undesirable
lower-frequency content in the series outside the business-cycle range. For this reason our findings do not5
periods, one finds that the standard deviation of output, consumption, investment, and the current
account (as a share of GDP) rises by about one-half from the time of the gold standard (1870-
1914) to the interwar period (1919-1939). Then, in the Bretton Woods period (1945-1971), these
standard deviations fall back to the level seen during the gold standard period, and in the more
recent period of floating exchange rates, the level of volatility falls lower still. Given the
uncertainties of interpreting annual historical data, it would be difficult to make a definitive case
that today's business cycles are less volatile than those of a century ago in this cross section of 15
countries, although Bergman, Bordo and Jonung (1998) make an effort along these lines.
However, the notion of significantly higher volatility in the interwar period can be easily
supported.
4
Although the volatility of consumption and the current account ratio are similar to that of
output, the volatility of investment is about three to four times higher. It is striking that the ratio
of investment volatility to consumption or output volatility seems to be fairly stable across all
four time periods, even though economic structures within countries and international linkages
across countries varied considerably. An adequate business cycle theory should seek to explain
the relatively high volatility of investment as compared to other aggregate quantities.
What might explain the common pattern of rising and then falling volatility over the very
long run? At one level, this pattern simply documents the enormous dislocations associated with
the Great Depression. This raises the question of whether the Depression should be treated as a
singular, anomalous event, or a litmus test for any general theory of business cycles. A middle-
of-the-road approach might attempt to develop a universal business cycle theory that includes
small and big recessions, while recognizing that something different may have occurred in the
1930s. For example, one possibility is that the interwar era was potentially a more volatile era, at
least in part, because World War I and various restrictions of the 1920s and 1930s led to a sharp
reduction in flows of international goods and capital. In turn, this meant that the ability to spread
risk in production and consumption activities via capital markets could also have led to autarkic
                                                                 
necessarily match previous findings. An example would be the autocorrelation of output: our study finds
much lower values for this parameter than is the case with Hodrick-Prescott (or linear, or quadratic)
detrending. This is another way of saying that other methods make the growth component "too smooth"
and the cyclical component more volatile and autocorrelated.
4. Most of our findings hold at the individual country level as well as in the pooled data. In what follows,
we try to indicate important cases when they do not. The longer working paper version of this analysis,
available from the authors upon request, provides a fuller depiction of the country-level results.6
tendencies in these economies, exacerbating any economic shocks that occurred (Obstfeld and
Taylor, 1999). Under this view, the more recent integration of the world's economies would help
to explain the lower amplitude of contemporary business cycles (Bergman, Bordo and Jonung,
1998). However, this explanation is not without its problems, or offsetting considerations. For
example, any shocks to an economy that affect investment productivity ought to have relatively
small effects on investment in autarkic economies, where investment is constrained by the supply
of domestic savings, but big effects in open economies, since foreign capital can move in or out
freely. However, investment volatility was higher in the period of interwar autarky than in other
eras. Thus, perhaps a more complex model is needed, or perhaps differing shocks need to be
admitted in different periods.
The evidence on volatility of price levels, in the fifth row of Table 1, gives a slightly
different perspective. There is clear evidence that the two periods of mostly fixed exchange
rates—the gold standard and Bretton Woods—delivered far less price volatility than the interwar
period. However, price level volatility in recent years seems to be slightly higher than in the
periods of fixed exchange rates. It should be noted that the pooled results mislead a little here:
they are heavily influenced by two outlandish episodes of inflation, the German hyperinflation in
the 1920s and the Argentine hyperinflations of the 1980s. But more broadly, it seems true that
when countries are committed to fixed nominal exchange rates, they are restrained from
engaging in discretionary monetary policy, and price levels move by less. The price evidence
offers some prima facie evidence that monetary policy and its interaction with exchange rate
regimes is one potential source of economic shocks. From this perspective, it seems somewhat
remarkable that the recent period of floating exchange rates has not unleashed any truly
substantial increase in price volatility as compared to the Bretton Woods era (with the egregious
exception, in our sample, of Argentina).
A second important property of macroeconomic time series, along with volatility, is
persistence, which can be measured as the autocorrelation of each variable with its value in the
previous time period. Evidence on persistence is presented in the second five rows of Table 1.
The level of persistence has been fairly low over the last 100 years for output, consumption, and
investment, but higher in the interwar and float periods. The interpretation of these results is not
straightforward, since over such a long time span the structure of the economy has probably
changed. Still, the association of higher persistence with floating-rate regimes again supports a
focus on money as an important part of the business cycle dynamic.7
The persistence of current accounts shows a pattern consistent with the descriptive data
on the evolution of the global capital market. As we have seen, capital flows were large in the
first and last sample periods; we now also see that they were much more persistent (Taylor,
1996). One rationalization for this pattern is that, under autarkic capital markets, not only do
capital flows tend to zero in size, they also become less sustainable over time. One way to think
of this is in terms of the adjustment speed towards equilibrium as defined by an economy’s long-
run budget constraint. For that constraint to be met, the current account must be stationary
(Wickens and Uctum, 1993; Trehan and Walsh, 1991). The ability to sustain persistent current
account deficits may be seen as a facet of the autarky versus openness continuum in capital
markets. Markets with information imperfections or transaction-cost barriers may be less likely
to support a prolonged one-way flow of capital (and, in the stock dimension, the corresponding
build up of indebtedness) as compared to perfectly functioning open markets.
A third characteristic of business-cycle data is the extent to which other series move with
output. The correlation of consumption with output, for example, seems to be about 0.6–0.7 in all
four time periods. This correlation is strikingly high, and suggests that consumption-smoothing
has been fairly uniform over time. This paints a very gloomy picture of the capacity of individual
countries to insulate themselves from output shocks through international risk-sharing.
5
Investment has also been highly correlated with output, though less so during the Bretton Woods
era. Here again, an open-economy perspective might argue that the pervasive capital controls of
the Bretton Woods era dampened the impact of foreign capital flows, thus lessening the
investment response in booms and busts, and moving an economy closer toward autarkic capital
market constraints. However, a parallel argument would then hold that the interwar period
should have had less volatility in investment as well, which clearly is not true. This suggests
trying to identify some structural differences in the interwar period that may have exacerbated
investment volatility, perhaps leaning on financial aspects of the Great Slump or debt-deflation
issues. The current account has generally moved in countercyclical fashion, as predicted by most
standard models with real shocks (Mendoza, 1991; Glick and Rogoff, 1992; Backus, Kehoe, and
                    
5. An attempt was also made to isolate local from global shocks by constructing a correlation of just the
country-specific components of the quantity series; that is, each of the data was first detrended for the
average world patterns, and then the correlations were re-estimated. These results do not greatly differ
from the raw results just reported, although the correlations of country-specific shocks to consumption
and output are smaller than in the raw data. This approach represents a standard test, in the case of
consumption, for the extent of international risk-sharing (Lewis, 1996).8
Kydland, 1994). But note that this correlation was strong under Bretton Woods, when the option
to use the current account as a buffer was seemingly weakest. In some dimensions, then, the
quantity evidence does not always line up simply and predictably with the stylized facts on
market integration. Here again, some further analysis of the types of admissible shocks seems
desirable.
 Finally, we can look at the comovements across countries, arbitrarily selecting the
United States as a benchmark. We soon encounter some more anomalies of the kind seen in
earlier studies (Backus, Kehoe and Kydland, 1993). There is very little cross-country correlation
in consumption. This demonstrates the extreme lack of risk-sharing in the global economy, for if
all country-specific risks were insured and diversified, then all consumption paths would move
together in response to shocks. Another striking finding is that investment is very positively
correlated across countries. In a standard model, where mobile capital is flowing in response to a
shock by leaving one country and heading overseas, one would expect a negative correlation
(unless all shocks are global in nature). Perhaps this result is an artifact of using two-country
models when the world has many more countries, so that investment booms on one country do
not automatically crowd out investment everywhere else: this is clearly a direction for future
research. The price correlations across countries line up with the predictions of the changing
monetary regimes. In the fixed exchange rate regimes, the rapid transmission of prices from
country to country was assured by relatively open markets for goods and a fixed exchange rate.
In the interwar period, this correlation broke down; prices had no need to move so much when
nominal exchange rates could do the adjusting. Bretton Woods was a return to the former
dynamic, and the float a rerun of the latter. It would be hard to imagine a business cycle model
that could produce predictions of these patterns in a cross-section of countries without explicit
attention to the changing monetary regime and the integration of global markets.
Some Key Issues in Choosing Between Business Cycle Models
Certain key questions arise across a range of plausible business cycle models. Should
monetary shocks be treated as neutral? Are nominal prices sticky? Do labor markets clear? Can a
plausible model of business cycles be set in a closed economy, or should presumption favor an
open-economy model? Although the preceding discussion has already hinted strongly at our
beliefs on some of these issues, it is useful to discuss why these questions matter in various9
business cycle models and what our historical and international evidence has to say about them.
Is Money Neutral?
In basic neoclassical models, money is neutral; that is, it does not affect real variables like
output or employment at any time horizon. One avenue for explaining business cycles is to argue
either that shocks to the money supply may have real effects on the economy, or that money may
play a role in propagating non-monetary shocks through an economy. A huge literature has
attempted to test for the effects of money on output, while attempting to control for reverse
causality from output to money. The literature is usually partitioned into the "narrative
approach," which tries to identify exogenous changes in money from institutional records
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Romer and Romer, 1989), and the statistical approach, which
attempts to do the same thing using an econometric model (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans,
1998, summarize recent work). Both approaches have found strong evidence that money is not
always neutral, especially in the short run.
However, the fundamental issue of causality continues to bedevil the literature on links
between money and output. Even if changes in money precede changes in output, one can argue
that there is a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy (Tobin, 1970). We believe that the behavior of
real exchange rates provides compelling evidence that money is not neutral, and evidence of a
sort that is easier to defend against the possibility of reverse causation.
If money is neutral, then the nominal exchange rate should move with inflation, while the
real exchange rate adjusts to changes in economic fundamentals (e.g., changes in national
saving). In an excellent survey, Devereux (1997) argues that the available evidence argues in
support of the notion that real exchange rates adjust to reflect purchasing power parity (PPP), but
the speed of adjustment toward the PPP exchange rate is extremely slow.
6 In the short run,
nominal exchange rates remain much more volatile than macroeconomic fundamentals would
predict (Meese and Rogoff, 1983). In their useful summary of the evidence on the behavior of
real exchange rates, Frankel and Rose (1995) point out that real and nominal exchange rates
seem to move virtually one-for-one.
                    
6. For further discussions of the adjustment speed, see Froot and Rogoff (1995) and Taylor (1995). Some
more recent work using nonlinear methods suggests that reversion might be "only" one or two years
(Obstfeld and Taylor, 1997; O'Connell and Wei, 1997), but even that speed of reversion would still seem
to indicate substantial impediments to short-run nominal adjustment.10
Table 2 presents some basic evidence on the relationship between monetary regime and
exchange rate volatility. The first row shows the volatility of nominal exchange rates based on
pooled data from 20 countries, as measured by the standard deviation of the log of the exchange
rate. The second row shows volatility of real exchange rates, calculated in the same way, where
the real exchange rate is calculated by converting all currencies into U.S. dollars. The third row
presents an alternative measure of real exchange rates, where the exchange rate for each country
is calculated relative to a basket of the 19 other currencies. Floating-rate eras such as the interwar
and the post-1971 years clearly show higher volatility of both real and nominal rates as
compared with fixed-rate eras such as the classical gold standard and Bretton Woods. This
association holds up just as well on a country-by-country basis.
While we believe that the evidence from real and nominal exchange rates demonstrates
convincingly that money is not neutral, several issues and puzzles remain. First, in looking at
exchange rate regimes to study the neutrality of money, it is important to remember that the
regime itself may be endogenous. Countries that face larger real shocks may allow their
exchange rates to float, while stable countries may use a fixed exchange rate as a nominal anchor
(Stockman, 1987). However, for certain major historical regime switches such an explanation
appears implausible. When Bretton Woods collapsed, for example, almost every country
abandoned fixed exchange rates at once. When the gold standard fell apart in the interwar period,
there was a systematic relationship between regime choice and real outcomes inconsistent with
the endogenous response story: those who abandoned gold did better (Eichengreen and Sachs,
1985; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998)—apparently, they were not being buffeted by larger real
shocks!
Second and more seriously, apart from a watershed historical event like the Great
Depression, there is little evidence that the behavior of real exchange rates matters for other
macroeconomic aggregates (Baxter and Stockman, 1989; Frankel and Rose, 1995). This finding
is a puzzle for models of all types, since every economic model argues that prices should matter
for the determination of quantities, even if models differ in their accounts of how these prices are
set.
Finally, what models can we use to explain the long-lasting real effects of money that are
evident in the behavior of real exchange rates? A variety of models with satisfactory
microfoundations have been proposed (see Devereux, 1997, for a survey), but so far none can
plausibly explain the persistence of the deviation of nominal exchange rates from their11
purchasing power parity levels. We believe that models with nominal rigidities of some sort hold
the most promise, and discuss such models in the next two subsections. Here, we simply
conclude that a good business cycle model should be able to deliver both short-run monetary
nonneutrality and long-run reversion to neutrality. For exchange rates, such a model should
produce what may seem like too much volatility in the short run, combined with a long-run
reversion to the purchasing power parity exchange rate. Further, the model should be able to
explain why properties like the degree of volatility in exchange rates will vary under different
monetary regimes.
Are Prices Sticky?
A variety of economic institutions could allow monetary shocks to have real effects. One
family of models is designed to obtain real effects of monetary shocks even with perfectly
flexible wages and prices. Perhaps the best-known of these models remains Lucas's striking
(1972) paper, which shows that monetary shocks can have real effects if people have incomplete
information and cannot distinguish between changes in relative prices and changes in the overall
price level. However, by the mid-1980s enough evidence had accumulated against this particular
model that it fell out of favor (Blanchard, 1990). A more recent model in a similar spirit stresses
the lack of continuous adjustment of real money balances (Lucas, 1990; Fuerst, 1992). In these
"liquidity" models, a change in the stock of high-powered money typically changes the real
interest rate, which affects the cost of working capital, and thus the aggregate demand for labor
and aggregate output, even though prices are flexible.
However, the earliest models of the real effects of money, dating back at least to Hume’s
1752 essay (reprinted 1955), have stressed slow adjustment of wages and/or prices. The "New
Keynesian" literature has emphasized flexible wages and sticky output prices. Given some
assumed nominal friction—for example, a small fixed cost of changing prices, often termed a
"menu cost"—this literature attempts to derive Keynesian results from rigorous foundations. For
analytical tractability, dynamic New Keynesian models typically assume that prices are set for a
fixed length of time: a so-called time-dependent rule.  The alternative is to assume a state-
dependent rule: firms face some cost of price adjustment, and thus do not change their prices
continuously or at fixed intervals of time, but rather when the benefit of changing the price
exceeds the cost. Dynamic state-dependent models are extremely difficult to analyze (Caplin and12
Leahy, 1997).
7  However, Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) had the insight that one can combine
some of the appealing features of both time- and state-dependent models in a tractable
framework. In their model, firms in each country follow a time-dependent pricing rule, but
choose the length of time between price changes to be optimal on average. They showed that in
such a framework, firms in high-inflation countries should change prices more frequently,
because the loss of keeping one's nominal price fixed is higher when inflation is high.
Kiley (1999) extends this insight to consider the persistence of output fluctuations. He
notes that in sticky-price models, output deviates from its long-run growth rate only as long as
there is significant nominal price inertia. But, following the logic of Ball, Mankiw and Romer
(1988), nominal prices change more quickly in countries with high average inflation rates. Thus,
countries with high mean inflation should have less persistent deviations of output from trend—a
linking of real and nominal variables that is difficult to rationalize unless sticky prices are a
major force propagating business cycles.
8  Kiley tests this insight in a regression framework. The
dependent variable is a measure of output persistence, the first autocorrelation of detrended (log)
output growth for each country. The explanatory variable is the level of mean (log) inflation. 
Using a sample of 43 countries over the 1948–96 period, Kiley finds a statistically significant,
negative connection between these variables, as the theory predicts.
9
Kiley's findings offer a simple and robust implication of fixed-price models, and it is
difficult to see how other classes of models would explain them.  Since his model relates output
persistence to the frequency of price change, one can interpret his results using that frequency as
                    
7. The first "New Keynesian" models of price stickiness, by Akerlof and Yellen (1985) and Mankiw
(1985), are static and state-dependent.
8. As Ball, Mankiw and Romer note, such a link certainly does not arise in the Lucas (1972) model. As for
the liquidity models, they typically have little to say about the persistence of output fluctuations.
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1997) argue that a liquidity model can explain the behavior of
corporate profits over the cycle better than a sticky-price model. However, the profit data that one
observes are accounting profits, not economic profits; Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) explain at length
why non-liquidity models can account equally well for the procyclical behavior of accounting profits.
9. We duplicated Kiley's exercise for our cross-section sample of 15 countries, but the results were not
statistically significant in any of four major time periods, and were of the "wrong" sign in several of the
periods. Our different findings seem to be caused by our different sample period and countries. Ssince our
sample consists predominantly of countries with stablemacroeconomic histories, we are probably lacking
some useful variation that would help pin down the relationship between inflation and output persistence.
For example, we are missing Brazil, Israel, and Peru, which are all high-inflation, low-persistence
countries in Kiley's sample. When we used Kiley's (1999) sample period (and detrending method) with
our 15 countries, we still get essentially no significant relationship between the two variables.13
a metric.  Kiley’s results imply that in the United States, which had 4 percent mean annual
inflation over the postwar period and highly serially correlated output, the average price was
changed once about every 2.5 years.  On the other hand, in Argentina, which had mean inflation
of 58 percent and little output persistence, prices changed more than once a year—an
economically significant difference.  However, this implication of Keynesian theory is hard to
reconcile with one of the facts we have noted above.  According to the Ball-Mankiw-
Romer/Kiley hypothesis, business-cycle fluctuations should have been much more volatile and
persistent in the Gold Standard period, which had very low mean inflation, than in the Floating
period, which had much higher inflation.  But as Table 1 shows, this prediction was not borne
out.  Thus, if one embraces the New Keynesian model, one has to find some offsetting factor in
order to explain the low persistence of fluctuations in the early periods.
The Great Depression provides further evidence in support of theories with nominal
rigidities. Countries that abandoned the gold standard, particularly those that devalued
aggressively and used their newfound monetary policy freedom, experienced faster recoveries.
Short-run competitive (real) depreciations drove current account balances to a surplus and
stimulated the economy; though prices did rise, they adjusted less rapidly than the exchange rate.
The experience of the Great Depression provides strong evidence, albeit based on one historical
episode, that money is not neutral and that monetary policy can drive large output fluctuations.
Given the magnitude of the Depression across so many countries, it seems implausible to
attribute this particular downturn to unobserved real shocks. Instead, most authors have sought a
monetary explanation of some sort or other. Friedman and Schwartz's (1963) magisterial account
of the Depression attributes its severity to U.S. monetary policy mistakes. Recent accounts by
economic historians such as Temin (1989) and Eichengreen (1992) also emphasize a monetary
origin for the global depression by drawing attention to instabilities and asymmetries in the
functioning of the interwar gold standard.
Thus, the data imply that nominal rigidities are important, and can lead even to such
massive economic downturns as the Great Depression. But we face the same question in
explaining large and long-lasting contractions in output as we do in explaining the exchange-rate
evidence: Can we reproduce these facts in a model built from rigorous microfoundations? The
New Keynesian research program has produced models where price stickiness comes from the
optimizing behavior of firms. But these models also imply that prices will not be sticky for long
periods of time, or in the face of large shocks, unless the private cost of price rigidity is small. In14
an insightful paper, Ball and Romer (1990) argue that there are two broad categories of reasons
why the private cost of price rigidity might be small, even if price rigidity is socially very
inefficient. First, the private cost is small if firms' marginal cost of production are not strongly
cyclical. Second, even if marginal cost is procyclical, the private cost of keeping prices fixed is
small if firms actually desire lower price-cost markups in booms. These features come from the
real side of a model, and have no necessary connection with nominal rigidities per se. In Ball and
Romer's terminology, one thus needs a model with a great deal of "real rigidity" to explain the
observed nominal price rigidity.
10
In practice, the most important real rigidities are probably those associated with the labor
market. We noted that the evidence from exchange rates and output fluctuations supports the
proposition that money is not neutral, but that evidence by itself fails to tell us whether the
nominal rigidity is in prices or wages. The evidence from Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988) and
Kiley (1999) might apply equally well to pre-set nominal wages as to pre-set prices. The
evidence that has been used to discriminate between these two Keynesian models is the cyclical
behavior of the real wage. We discuss some of this evidence in the next section.
Does the Labor Market Clear?
Modeling the labor market is a challenge and a puzzle for all classes of business cycle
theories. A model of business cycles should be able to explain one of the most robust stylized
facts of economic fluctuations: that consumption and labor input both track the business
cycle—labor hours almost one-for-one with output, consumption less than one-for-one.
Reproducing this comovement, however, has proved a challenge for business cycle theory.
It is now usual in business cycle models to represent the household side of these models
with a representative consumer who takes prices as given, and freely chooses consumption and
labor supply. Then utility-maximizing households must, at all points in time, equate the marginal
utility of leisure to the real wage multiplied by the marginal utility of consumption. Barro and
King (1984) point out that under reasonable conditions, this relationship implies that if
consumption and labor supply are rising and falling together over the business cycle, then real
                    
10. Ball and Romer (1990) derived their propositions in the static setting of the early menu cost models.
Kimball (1995) confirms that their results hold in a dynamic setting, in a model that is also consistent
with the facts about long-run growth. However, Kimball (1995) and Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan (1996)
disagree on the extent to which reasonable real rigidities can explain large and persistent output15
wages must be procyclical as well.
11 In this framework, which is common to most modern
business-cycle models, only a procyclical real wage can rationalize the positive comovement of
consumption and labor over the business cycle. This conclusion holds regardless of the other
details of the model—whether the cycle is driven by supply or demand shocks, whether firms are
imperfect competitors, or whether nominal prices are sticky.
Thus, business-cycle theorists face two choices:  They can build models in which the real
wage is procyclical, or they can deny the proposition that workers freely choose labor and
consumption at given wages and prices. We discuss these two alternatives in turn.
To consider models in which the real wage is procyclical, suppose a representative firm is
assumed to be a price taker in factor markets; thus, the firm equates its nominal marginal revenue
product of labor to the going nominal wage. However, the firm may be operating in an
imperfectly competitive market for its output, and thus have some market power to mark up price
over marginal cost. In this framework, there are three main ways in which a procyclical real
wage can be consistent with cost minimization by firms.
First, the markup may fall during booms. In sticky price models, for example, the markup
falls during booms as firms leave their prices fixed but face increasing marginal costs of
production in a boom—especially a higher real wage. Other models assume that prices are
flexible but show that firms may lower their optimal markups in booms, either because they want
to "lock-in" new customers (Bils, 1989; Warner and Barsky, 1995), or because they cannot
sustain a high degree of collusion in times of high demand (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1995).
This approach has been the focus of most New Keynesian theories of the business cycle.
Second, technology may improve during booms. This is the domain of the standard real
business cycle model where cycles are driven by exogenous changes in technology, and where
improved technology drives both higher wages and higher output. A variant of this approach in
Shleifer (1986) presents a model where technical improvements are demand-induced. A recent
literature stresses, however, that the short-run effects of technology improvements can be quite
different in a world where prices are sticky. Gali (1998) and Basu, Fernald and Kimball (1998)
                                                                 
fluctuations.
11. This implication is not a general consequence of consumer optimization, but it holds if there is a
representative consumer whose utility at each date is a function only of consumption and leisure at that
date. This framework does allow for "preference shocks" which can change the marginal rate of
substitution between consumption and leisure, even at a fixed real wage. However, it is unappealing to16
argue that if prices are sticky, a technology improvement lowers employment in the short run,
and may lower output as well. Thus, the assumption of flexible prices in the real business cycle
model is not merely an assumption of convenience; it is essential for generating the desired
outcomes of the story.
Third, if there are increasing returns to scale of a particularly strong form, the marginal
product of labor might rise as more labor is employed during booms. A number of papers have
shown that if this effect is sufficiently strong multiple equilibria may exist, with higher output
equilibria being superior in welfare terms; for early work in this area, see the symposium in the
1994 Journal of Economic Theory. However, there is no evidence that returns to scale are large
enough to produce these multiple equilibria (Basu and Fernald, 1997; Schmitt-Grohé, 1997). An
alternative approach has been to substitute sufficiently countercyclical markups for economies of
scale (Gali, 1994), but this approach also requires a markup that is too high to be plausible
(Schmitt-Grohé, 1997). A more recent approach has attempted to produce multiple equilibria
with smaller returns to scale by using multi-sector models (Benhabib and Farmer, 1996;
Benhabib and Nishimura, 1998). The major difficulty of most multi-sector models is that they
tend to have one or more sectors that contract while the overall economy is expanding—a
phenomenon that is not observed in the data (Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny, 1989).
"Equilibrium" models with labor markets that clear are obviously attractive to
economists, but they now appear implausible. Remember, labor fluctuates almost as much as
output over the business cycle. However, the elasticity of labor supply with respect to wages
appears to be relatively small.  If workers willingly supply so much more labor, then the required
change in the real wage to call forth this labor supply is immense. In general, therefore, a
clearing labor market is an embarrassment for all business-cycle theories that assume workers
are on their labor supply curves. In the context of the real business cycle and other real models, it
means that the shocks hitting the economy must be extremely large—and such shocks are hard to
identify. In the context of sticky-price models, it means that firms' marginal costs are extremely
procyclical—so much so that they would not hold prices fixed.
12
One alternative is to posit so-called "Old Keynesian" models in which workers are not on
their labor supply curves. Keynes (1936, ch. 20) clearly believed that quantity rationing in the
                                                                 
embrace a model that implies some recessions are times of spontaneous laziness.
12.  Romer (1993) has an insightful discussion of labor market rigidity and its relationship to New17
labor market was an essential feature of his theory of unemployment. Most early Keynesian
models thus assumed that nominal wages are sticky, and also that employment is determined by
labor demand. These assumptions allowed for the possibility of involuntary unemployment in
recessions, if the real wage exceeded its market-clearing level. In contrast to the "equilibrium"
models we have discussed, these models generally predict that real wages should be
countercyclical.
13 Almost from its inception, however, the literature on nominal wage stickiness
was criticized precisely because it implied a countercyclical real wage. Dunlop (1938), for
example, argued that the evidence contradicts this implication of Keynes's General Theory. 
14
Another possibility is to marry some of the equilibrium models discussed above with
labor market imperfections that keep workers off their labor supply curves. These models
typically also imply that real wages are procyclical, but not as procyclical as they would be if the
labor market cleared. The desire to have a model that predicts roughly acyclical real wages has
led a number of New Keynesian macroeconomists to embrace labor market imperfections. For
example, Akerlof and Yellen (1985) assume that there are efficiency wages in the labor market,
where workers are paid above their marginal product to encourage effort and discourage
turnover, along with sticky prices in the product market.  The problem with this approach is that
it does not suffice to explain all the facts.  If efficiency-wage theory is correct and effective labor
supply is very elastic, then we should observe a high participation elasticity (large movements in
and out of the labor force in response to real wage changes), even if the labor supply elasticity of
employed workers is low.  It is true that the participation elasticity is usually estimated to be
larger than the hours elasticity of employed workers, but not by so much as to make a major
difference for business-cycle modeling.
15  Thus, the real challenge is to explain how the real
wage that firms pay can be relatively acyclical even when both estimated elasticities are
relatively small.
Finally, one can marry the New and Old Keynesian approaches, and argue that real wages
                                                                 
Keynesian theory.
13. It is logically possible to have a model with sticky nominal wages but with markups so
countercyclical that real wages rise in expansions. However, this model makes the unappealing prediction
that increases in aggregate demand reduce the price level.
14.  Dunlop (1998) discusses his exchange with Keynes.
15.  The same objection applies to the "indivisible labor" model of Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988). 
That model, which is widely used in the real-business-cycle literature, implies that the observed
participation elasticity should be infinite.18
may be not be strongly procyclical because both wages and prices have nominal inertia (Barro
and Grossman, 1971; Erceg, 1997).  However, this approach has some of the same costs as Old
Keynesian theory, one of which is that one must abandon equilibrium modeling of household
decisions—in this model, households are quantity-constrained in the labor market.
If workers are not on their labor supply curves, either because of real imperfections in the
labor market or due to nominal wage rigidity, business cycle modeling becomes dramatically
easier. If real wages, and hence firms' marginal costs, are not strongly procyclical, then nominal
inertia will last much longer, and nominal shocks will have the large real effects in the models
that they seem to have in the data.
Thus, business cycles models with clearing labor markets predict strongly procyclical real
wages, while models with imperfect labor markets predict acyclical or countercyclical real
wages. We can examine the empirical evidence on real wages over the business cycle with
historical and international data. Table 4 presents evidence on the real wage, pooling data across
13 countries. In keeping with the format of Table 1, earlier, the first two rows present
information on the volatility and persistence of real wages. The last row presents evidence on the
comovement of wages and output.
16
The real wage is basically acyclical during the first two periods of our study and
reasonably procyclical in the third and fourth. At face value, these results are something of a
puzzle. In the first two periods, the wage is not so procyclical as to support the hypothesis that
the labor market clears, but neither is it strongly countercyclical, as "old" Keynesian theory
predicts it should be. These results admit of several lines of interpretation: we can question the
validity of the data itself, or we can seek explanations for the observed patterns.
One data issue that makes us hesitate to endorse the conclusion that real wages were
actually acyclical for most of our sample concerns a built-in composition bias in the wage data.
Stockman (1983) suggests that workers hired during a boom may be of lower average quality.
Solon, Barsky and Parker (1994) show that Stockman's conjecture is correct: real wages
controlling for worker characteristics are much more procyclical than average wage indices of
the sort that we are forced to use. However, the composition bias applies to data from all periods,
so it does not obviously explain the subsample differences we observe.
A second issue concerning the wage data is that the real wage we observe need not be the
                    
16. Once again, we employ bandpass prefilters; see note 2 for a discussion.19
effective real wage. For example, Bils (1987) argues that in the United States the marginal wage
is more procyclical than the average wage because of the statutory overtime premium mandated
by the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. The overtime premium may be relevant only for
particular countries and recent historical periods, but other reasons along these lines may be
more general. The possibility of a gap between actual and effective wages raises difficult issues
for studying the behavior of wages over the business cycle.
But let us assume that the wage patterns we have found—namely, acyclicality over the
first two time periods and procyclicality in the two most recent periods—do in fact hold, despite
concerns over the data. How might a business-cycle model explain such a pattern?
First, perhaps demand shocks lead to countercylical changes in real wages, in the spirit of
traditional Keynesian models, while supply shocks lead to procyclical changes, in the spirit of
real business cycle models. Thus, it could be that in earlier time periods, supply and demand
shocks roughly offset each other. However, the more recent period of floating exchange rates
includes several large oil price shocks, both negative shocks in the 1970s and a positive shock in
the 1980s. Perhaps the strong procyclicality of the real wage in the most recent period is due to
the greater importance of supply shocks. This possible answer arrives with its own questions.
Under standard conditions—perfect competition and the existence of a value-added production
function for GDP—the ratio of the nominal wage to the GDP deflator should be unaffected by
changes in oil price (Rotemberg and Woodford, 1996). But we are deflating the nominal wage by
the Consumer Price Index, and Barsky and Kilian (1998) establish that the CPI changes far more
than the GDP deflator during oil shocks. Thus, increases in oil prices will tend to lower our
measure of the real wage at the same time that they lower output (either directly, or because
central banks try to fight the inflationary effects of oil price increases).
To find support for a pattern of countercyclical wages at times of demand shocks, an
obvious place to look is at a business cycle that is broadly agreed to have resulted from demand
shocks—the Great Depression. In their path-breaking paper on the Depression, Eichengreen and
Sachs (1985) argued in favor of the traditional sticky-wage story. Their empirical work has been
extended in a careful paper by Bernanke and Carey (1996) who find that real wages were
strongly countercyclical in a 22-country sample over the years 1931–36. We sought to replicate
these results in a 13-country sample. Our data show some heterogeneity in the cyclicality of real
wages across countries, and sensitivity to the sample period. For the Bernanke and Carey sample
period from 1931–36, mostly the recovery phase of the Great Depression, we find that although20
eight of our 13 countries experienced countercyclical real wages over this period, some of the
others had strongly procyclical real wages, including the United States and United Kingdom.
However, for the Eichengreen-Sachs sample period from 1929–35, which includes the downturn
phase of the Depression, nine out of 13 had countercyclical real wages and only one (Spain) had
markedly procyclical real wages. Clearly, this sample problem is a matter of concern, as is the
precise approach to defining real wages given the data.
17 More work is needed to formulate
robust findings about the degree of stickiness in wages and prices during the Depression, and
there is some suggestion that stickiness might have been more of an issue during the onset of the
Depression than during the recovery (Bordo, Erceg and Evans, 1997).
A second possible interpretation is that the the real wage may have been approximately
acyclical in the early periods, even in response to demand shocks, if prices and wages were about
equally sticky. Real wages may then be procyclical in the last period because prices have become
less procyclical, or nominal wages more so. Hanes (1999) finds evidence that prices were more
procyclical before World War II than in the postwar period—a change that he attributes to an
increase in the number of stages of processing of the typical product. More roundabout
production can increase price stickiness—a conjecture dating at least to Means (1935), and
investigated formally by Blanchard (1987) and Basu (1995).
Although many business cycle models seek to deliver a procyclical relationship between
real wages and output, we believe that such a pattern occurs only at certain times and places.
Real wages have been more procyclical in the recent past than at any previous time, which may
explain the recent popularity of models that predict strongly procyclical real wages. But based on
our examination of the historical data, we urge business cycle theorists to consider models that
can produce wage patterns that are procyclical, countercyclical, and sometimes just acyclical.
Part of the payoff to such an effort, we suspect, will be a model in which it is easier to explain
the large fluctuations in labor supply that we observe over the business cycle.
                    
17. Twelve of our 13 countries are in the Bernanke and Carey (1996)  sample; Spain is the exception. We
do prefer our real wage data because our nominal wages are deflated by the Consumer Price Index, the
theoretically-correct price index for studying the tradeoff between consumption and leisure. By contrast,
Bernanke and Carey use the Wholesale Price Index which, because of the large weight it gives to
commodity prices, is extremely cyclically sensitive. Thus, we suspect that their use of the WPI is at least
partially responsible for their finding of an extremely countercyclical real wage. This is not the only data
problem: there still remains the problem of composition bias alluded to in our earlier discussion of wage
cyclicality; however, its importance in the Great Depression period is now in doubt (Dighe, 1997).21
Business Cycles and the Open Economy
Some business cycle models assume a purely closed economy, but such models are
obviously questionable when applied to the open global economy of the late 19th century, and
perhaps to the increasingly globalized world of the last few decades. Other studies explicitly
admit models of capital mobility, with adjustments in consumption and investment relative to
output mediated via the current account. Yet these models may not be appropriate in a world of
limited capital mobility, as was the case for several decades in the middle of the 20th century.
One potentially useful approach here would be to specify the underlying conditions that
lead the economy to be open or closed, and then to bring those conditions into one's model of the
busines cycle. Obstfeld and Taylor (1998) offer a political economy interpretation based on what
they call the macroeconomic policy trilemma. In this view, policymakers have wrestled with
three basic macroeconomic challenges for over 100 years: a desire to have fixed exchange rates
to avoid instability; a desire to have free capital mobility, to ensure efficient allocation and
permit smoothing; and a desire to engage in activist monetary policy to address domestic policy
goals. The trilemma points out that three goals are mutually inconsistent: only two out of three
are attainable. The gold standard solved the trilemma by choosing fixed exchange rates and
capital mobility, but left no room for activist policies—that is, interest rates were set in the world
market. The 1920s and the Depression saw the rise of capital controls in some countries, and
floating exchange rates in others, as a means to admit activist monetary policy. These events
have been seen as a response to a changing distribution of political power away from orthodox
financial interests, and toward non-elites, the working classes, organized labor, and the like
(Polanyi, 1944; Eichengreen, 1996; Obstfeld and Taylor, 1998). Bretton Woods made a
compromise; to let fixed rates back in, while still allowing discretionary monetary policy, capital
mobility had to be sacrificed. The more recent period of floating exchange rates gave up on fixed
rates, but allowed capital mobility and activist monetary policy. Save for a few unusual
experiments, like the move to European Monetary Union (a common currency offering
something of an escape from the country-level trilemma), this is where we stand today, and
Eichengreen's (1996, p. 192) conclusion appears to hold: floating rates are here to stay.
Any business-cycle theory with long-run applicability needs to keep in mind the tradeoff
between macroeconomic activism, capital controls, and fixed exchange rates. Any naïve attempt
to approach the macrohistorical data without some knowledge of these institutional events, and22
the broad contours of change in the global capital market, could lead to major misinterpretations.
Our empirical work underscores the importance of changing external constraints. For example, it
seems likely that an open capital market should lead to more volatile investment, thanks to an
inflow and outflow of capital, and less volatile consumption, because of greater possibilities for
smoothing consumption (Razin and Rose, 1994). By definition it will lead to more a volatile
current account (that is, one not fixed at zero). However, different models can sometimes
produce unexpected results, depending on the separability of saving and investment decisions,
differences in the variability and persistence of shocks, and by differences across countries in
technology and preferences (Mendoza, 1994). In another example, we know that in a world of
perfect risk-sharing across nations, all agents would hold an internaionally diversified wealth
portfolio, and all wealth shocks would then be identical across countries! In practice, however,
most countries seem far from that diversified outcome—an observation termed the "home bias"
or "international diversification" puzzle. However, depending again on the degree of integration
in capital markets, we may expect to see more or less of this kind of diversification going on, and
accordingly more or less cross-country similarities in consumption patterns (Obstfeld, 1994;
Lewis, 1996). These and other features of the data are issues that the next generation of open-
economy business-cycle models must confront.
Conclusion
The evidence strongly suggests that money is not neutral. It is certainly difficult to
explain the Great Depression without citing the effects of the gold standard, and it is difficult to
reconcile the large changes in the time-series properties of real variables across different
exchange rate regimes without admitting some role for money. However, the channel by which
money has its effects on the economy is still very much an open question. We have noted some
evidence that favors models with nominal rigidities, but we need more evidence on this point.
Even within the class of Keynesian models, it is not clear whether the sticky-price or the sticky-
wage model is more plausible. More attention to these questions seems desirable, though
sensitivity to country- and time-specific features—history and institutions—is likely to color this
line of inquiry.
However, even if one accepts our views regarding the class of plausible models, there is
still a large gap between the models and the data. Most reasonably-parameterized models imply23
that marginal cost is very procyclical, but in fact, prices seem to move by relatively little. Thus,
much of modern business-cycle theory amounts to a search for empirically-supported
mechanisms to explain why marginal cost should not rise much when output expands (for
example, nominal or real wage rigidity), or reasons why firms should accept lower profit margins
in booms. While economists debate the ultimate form of "the" right business cycle model, there
is scope for much useful research on general sources of propagation which will be useful for
explaining business cycles in almost any model. We see this line of research as both necessary
and fruitful, and urge a renewed focus on studying the labor market.
Our work has also raised important questions about research on business cycles that fails
to take international linkages into account. Closed-economy macroeconomics may have been
well suited to a few decades in the middle of the twentieth century, but its relevance in other
historical episodes—and in the globalized worlds of the present and future—seems inherently
limited. Surely, both theory and empirical will move more in the direction of open economy
models, with closed economy models derived as a special case.
Finally, our work highlights the political economy choices available and the constraints
facing policymakers—such as the classic trilemma—and how these can inform the model, its
structure, its shocks, its calibration, its predictions, and its scope for policy activism at different
times in different regimes. We cannot claim to understand the determinants of business cycles
without being able to explain why some of their characteristics have changed significantly over
the past century and why some have not. Only with attention to the historical and institutional
context can we achieve a more complete understanding of economic fluctuations.24
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Gold Standard Interwar Bretton Woods Float
Volatility log Y 0.027 0.036 0.025 0.016
log C 0.034 0.042 0.032 0.016
log I 0.113 0.186 0.103 0.068
CA/Y 0.051 0.042 0.024 0.027
log P 0.033 0.742 0.046 0.163
Persistence log Y -0.062 0.185 -0.028 0.221
log C -0.012 0.060 -0.008 0.199
log I -0.128 0.125 -0.093 0.176
CA/Y 0.835 0.565 0.395 0.774
log P 0.164 0.175 0.405 0.489
Comovement log C 0.650 0.664 0.727 0.613
with Output log I 0.461 0.487 0.368 0.778
CA/Y -0.054 -0.073 -0.233 -0.175
log P -0.277 -0.041 -0.135 -0.356
Comovement log C 0.084 -0.008 0.035 0.150
with U.S. log I 0.074 0.427 0.276 0.237
CA/Y 0.033 -0.266 -0.104 -0.058
log P 0.128 0.038 0.241 0.055
Notes: Pooled data for 15 countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. For series x, volatility is standard
deviation of x; persistence is is autocorrelation of x with its first lag; comovement with output is correlation of x
with log Y; comovement with U.S. is correlation of x with the U.S. series x. All series are bandpass prefiltered. See
text.
Table 2
Real and Nominal Exchange-Rate Volatility
Statistic
Gold Standard Interwar Bretton Woods Float
Volatility E 0.051 0.162 0.145 0.424
RER-US 0.056 0.173 0.094 0.129
RER-W 0.054 0.088 0.062 0.110
Notes: Pooled data for 20 countries: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Italy, Japan, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom,
United States. E is the nominal exchange rate, RER-US the real exchange rate relative to the U.S. dollar, and RER-
W is the real exchange rate relative to a basket of the 19 other currencies. Volatility is standard deviation of log x,




Gold Standard Interwar Bretton Woods Float
Volatility 0.038 0.042 0.042 0.033
Persistence 0.138 0.098 0.151 0.166
Comovement 0.025 -0.059 0.162 0.271
with Output
Notes: Pooled data for 13 countries: Argentina, Australia, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands,
Norway, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States.  Given the real wage w, volatility is standard deviation of
log w; persistence is is autocorrelation of log w with its first lag; comovement with output is correlation of log w
with log Y. All series are bandpass prefiltered. See text.32
Appendix 1: Data
This study uses the dataset of Obstfeld and Taylor (1999). Full bibliographic details of the
sources, and the complete dataset, are available from the authors upon request. Summary details are
provided below.
Real output is denoted Y and the real wage w. The price series P was based on consumer prices.
Real investment I was calculated as the investment-to-GDP ratio I/Y times real output Y. Real
consumption (public plus private) C was calculated as one minus the saving-to-GDP ratio (1-S/Y) times
real output Y. Current-account-to-GDP ratio CA/Y was calculated as the investment-to-GDP ratio I/Y
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I/Y: 1861–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–64, Taylor. 1965–92, World Bank.
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P: Consumer price deflator.
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w: Not available.
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I/Y: 1861–1945: Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–66: Mitchell. Converted from US dollars using E after 1948.
1967–92, World Bank.
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Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.33
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Taylor. 1967–92, World Bank.
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Spain
Y: 1850–1964, Prados. 1964–92, World Bank.
w: 1850–1992, Williamson.34
S/Y: 1850–1964, Prados. 1965–1966, Carreras/Barciela (I) and Mitchell (CA converted using E).
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Y: Nominal: 1861–59, Mitchell. 1960–92, World Bank. Deflator: 1861–1880, Mitchell. 1880–59,
1850–1992, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.
w: 1850–1992, Williamson.
S/Y: 1861–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–1966, Mitchell. 1967–92, World Bank.
I/Y: 1861–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–1966, Mitchell. 1967–92, World Bank.
P: 1850–1880, Mitchell. 1880–59, 1850–1992, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.
United Kingdom
Y: 1850–1880, Mitchell. 1880–1988, Y deflated by PY.
w: 1850–1992, Williamson.
S/Y: 1850–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–66, Taylor. 1967–92, World Bank.
I/Y: 1850–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–66, Taylor. 1967–92, World Bank.
P: 1850–70, Mitchell. 1870–79, Bordo and Rockoff. 1880–1959, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World
Bank.
United States
Y: Nominal: 1871–1939, Jones and Obstfeld. 1939–1959, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.
Deflator 1871–1959, 1850–1992, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.
w: 1850–1992, Williamson.
S/Y: 1869–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–64, Taylor. 1965–92, World Bank.
I/Y: 1869–1945, Jones and Obstfeld. 1946–64, Taylor. 1965–92, World Bank.
P: 1870–79, Bordo and Rockoff. 1880–1959, 1850–1992, Bordo and Jonung. 1960–92, World Bank.
Appendix 2: Complete Empirical Results
To conserve space, the main text reports only the pooled coefficients. This appendix shows at greater
length the complete correlations of all variables for all countries.35
Table A1
Exchange Rate Volatility
Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Volatility, E
Argentina 0.130 0.120 0.179 0.928 29 21 26 23
Australia 0.004 0.116 0.071 0.125 34 20 24 21
Belgium 0.042 0.167 0.021 0.128 33 21 26 21
Brazil 0.154 0.180 0.223 0.848 24 21 26 20
Canada 0.000 0.043 0.026 0.041 34 21 25 21
Denmark 0.021 0.112 0.066 0.124 33 21 26 21
Finland 0.003 0.246 0.171 0.093 32 21 26 19
France 0.003 0.225 0.074 0.129 33 21 22 21
Germany 0.002 0.093 0.042 0.118 33 15 23 21
Italy 0.021 0.235 0.203 0.125 33 21 26 21
Japan 0.050 0.107 0.367 0.118 33 21 26 19
Mexico 0.067 0.081 0.088 0.325 34 21 26 21
Netherlands 0.003 0.108 0.057 0.118 34 21 26 21
Norway 0.003 0.170 0.062 0.086 34 21 26 21
Portugal 0.072 0.327 0.021 0.129 23 21 26 20
Spain 0.065 0.163 0.114 0.129 33 17 24 21
Sweden 0.000 0.123 0.074 0.103 33 21 26 21
Switzerland 0.042 0.117 0.010 0.130 33 21 26 20
United Kingdom 0.003 0.106 0.063 0.101 34 20 24 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.051 0.162 0.145 0.424 643 408 506 423
Volatility, RER-US
Argentina 0.081 0.137 0.169 0.324 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.040 0.137 0.066 0.120 34 20 24 21
Belgium 0.070 0.428 0.040 0.125 33 19 25 21
Brazil 0.087 0.192 0.136 0.124 24 21 26 20
Canada 0.034 0.042 0.033 0.042 34 21 25 21
Denmark 0.044 0.108 0.089 0.127 33 21 26 21
Finland 0.048 0.270 0.144 0.088 32 21 26 19
France 0.066 0.115 0.067 0.118 33 17 22 21
Germany 0.027 0.094 0.055 0.120 33 15 23 21
Italy 0.027 0.211 0.194 0.106 33 21 26 21
Japan 0.086 0.107 0.029 0.125 28 21 21 18
Mexico 0.113 0.145 0.095 0.165 27 21 26 21
Netherlands 0.031 0.118 0.054 0.120 34 21 26 21
Norway 0.030 0.153 0.061 0.086 34 21 25 21
Portugal 0.088 0.249 0.080 0.091 23 21 26 10
Spain 0.068 0.177 0.113 0.118 33 17 24 21
Sweden 0.032 0.124 0.077 0.098 33 21 26 21
Switzerland 0.048 0.125 0.040 0.130 21 21 26 18
United Kingdom 0.022 0.096 0.066 0.096 34 20 24 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.056 0.173 0.094 0.129 619 402 499 400
Volatility, RER-W
Argentina 0.075 0.106 0.150 0.360 21 11 21 10
Australia 0.036 0.085 0.049 0.131 21 11 21 10
Belgium 0.062 0.107 0.022 0.059 21 11 21 10
Brazil 0.088 0.135 0.144 0.109 21 11 21 10
Canada 0.030 0.057 0.027 0.085 21 11 21 10
Denmark 0.047 0.151 0.052 0.126 21 11 21 10
Finland 0.027 0.070 0.053 0.047 21 11 21 10
France 0.056 0.069 0.059 0.062 21 11 21 10
Germany 0.017 0.046 0.030 0.056 21 11 21 10
Italy 0.025 0.073 0.026 0.061 21 11 21 10
Japan 0.059 0.090 0.029 0.094 21 11 21 10
Mexico 0.118 0.104 0.063 0.119 21 11 21 10
Netherlands 0.034 0.063 0.025 0.056 21 11 21 10
Norway 0.026 0.076 0.032 0.033 21 11 21 10
Portugal 0.083 0.076 0.036 0.063 21 11 21 10
Spain 0.075 0.091 0.086 0.064 21 11 21 10
Sweden 0.022 0.055 0.018 0.029 21 11 21 10
Switzerland 0.037 0.053 0.020 0.081 21 11 21 10
United Kingdom 0.022 0.035 0.034 0.080 21 11 21 10
United States 0.027 0.086 0.023 0.072 21 11 21 10


































Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Volatility
Argentina 0.102 0.038 0.068 0.106 34 21 26 17
Australia 0.046 0.041 0.021 0.026 34 21 26 17
Canada 0.028 0.031 0.018 0.016 34 21 26 17
Denmark 0.027 0.054 0.021 0.014 34 21 26 17
France 0.018 0.035 0.021 0.006 34 21 26 17
Germany 0.019 0.025 0.021 0.010 34 16 22 17
Italy 0.014 0.074 0.066 0.015 34 21 26 17
Netherlands 0.029 0.034 0.020 0.015 34 21 26 17
Norway 0.031 0.030 0.017 0.021 34 21 26 17
Spain 0.033 0.062 0.103 0.030 34 21 26 17
Sweden 0.026 0.037 0.016 0.018 34 21 26 17
United Kingdom 0.023 0.028 0.019 0.016 34 21 26 17
United States 0.016 0.031 0.009 0.015 34 21 26 17
Pooled 0.038 0.042 0.042 0.033 442 268 334 221
Persistence
Argentina 0.190 -0.051 0.172 0.163 34 21 26 17
Australia 0.103 0.187 0.210 0.083 34 21 26 17
Canada -0.117 0.140 -0.126 0.265 34 21 26 17
Denmark 0.416 0.154 0.068 0.316 34 21 26 17
France 0.032 0.369 0.297 0.160 34 21 26 17
Germany -0.042 0.114 0.498 0.547 34 15 21 17
Italy 0.118 -0.120 0.288 -0.315 34 21 26 17
Netherlands 0.076 -0.047 -0.071 0.204 34 21 26 17
Norway -0.007 0.045 0.140 0.511 34 21 26 17
Spain -0.033 0.283 0.070 0.119 34 21 26 17
Sweden 0.123 0.185 0.138 0.004 34 21 26 17
United Kingdom 0.015 0.263 0.035 0.096 34 21 26 17
United States 0.219 0.120 0.026 0.334 34 21 26 17
Pooled 0.138 0.098 0.151 0.166 442 267 333 221
Comovement With Output
Argentina -0.021 -0.135 0.708 0.502 30 21 26 17
Australia 0.013 0.190 -0.215 -0.225 34 21 26 17
Canada -0.236 0.259 0.128 0.228 34 21 26 17
Denmark 0.147 -0.209 0.170 -0.214 34 19 26 17
France 0.120 -0.065 -0.094 0.239 34 18 23 17
Germany 0.412 -0.543 0.327 0.114 34 14 22 17
Italy -0.214 -0.311 0.364 0.028 34 21 26 17
Netherlands 0.130 0.310 0.720 0.082 34 21 26 17
Norway 0.001 0.094 0.093 0.293 34 21 26 17
Spain 0.081 0.033 -0.358 -0.003 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.001 0.162 -0.154 0.208 34 21 26 17
United Kingdom 0.217 -0.610 0.112 0.596 34 21 26 17
United States 0.007 -0.444 0.381 0.503 34 21 26 17
Pooled 0.025 -0.059 0.162 0.271 438 257 331 221
Comovement With Output (Country-Specific Components)
Argentina -0.063 0.137 0.770 0.494 30 11 22 17
Australia -0.080 -0.374 -0.008 -0.328 30 11 22 17
Canada -0.204 0.483 0.212 0.160 30 11 22 17
Denmark 0.086 0.371 0.311 0.092 30 11 22 17
France 0.009 0.453 -0.239 0.613 30 11 22 17
Germany 0.028 -0.381 -0.041 0.154 30 11 22 17
Italy 0.116 -0.218 -0.475 -0.091 30 11 22 17
Netherlands 0.125 0.578 0.196 0.036 30 11 22 17
Norway 0.190 -0.033 0.020 0.524 30 11 22 17
Spain 0.006 0.250 -0.197 0.127 30 11 22 17
Sweden 0.194 0.603 0.053 -0.049 30 11 22 17
United Kingdom 0.107 0.076 0.175 0.561 30 11 22 17
United States 0.312 -0.496 0.720 0.637 30 11 22 17
Pooled 0.006 0.053 0.092 0.308 390 143 286 221
Comovement With U.S.
Argentina -0.156 -0.277 -0.406 -0.471 34 21 26 17
Australia -0.249 -0.548 -0.160 -0.281 34 21 26 17
Canada 0.164 0.102 0.155 0.470 34 21 26 17
Denmark -0.304 -0.112 -0.288 -0.211 34 21 26 17
France 0.259 -0.160 0.541 0.245 34 21 26 17
Germany 0.311 -0.416 -0.103 -0.038 34 16 22 17
Italy 0.328 0.031 -0.442 0.478 34 21 26 17
Netherlands 0.116 -0.360 0.060 -0.135 34 21 26 17
Norway 0.224 0.092 0.244 -0.101 34 21 26 17
Spain -0.123 -0.493 0.049 0.189 34 21 26 17
Sweden 0.163 -0.281 -0.297 0.243 34 21 26 17
United Kingdom 0.034 -0.054 0.247 0.118 34 21 26 17
United States ———— ————
















































Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Volatility
log Y Argentina 0.044 0.029 0.030 0.031 30 21 26 23
Australia 0.034 0.032 0.021 0.013 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.032 0.054 0.017 0.015 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.023 0.043 0.028 0.014 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.020 0.026 0.019 0.021 34 21 26 21
France 0.029 0.044 0.024 0.009 34 18 23 21
Germany 0.020 0.049 0.024 0.014 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.026 0.029 0.033 0.014 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.023 0.038 0.020 0.015 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.038 0.028 0.035 0.012 34 21 26 19
Norway 0.010 0.032 0.017 0.013 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.014 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.015 0.040 0.015 0.011 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.031 0.033 0.033 0.017 34 21 26 21
United States 0.019 0.039 0.021 0.017 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.027 0.036 0.025 0.016 501 299 377 305
log C Argentina 0.077 0.029 0.043 0.042 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.048 0.053 0.031 0.011 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.033 0.045 0.020 0.011 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.031 0.046 0.043 0.010 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.025 0.034 0.033 0.014 34 21 26 21
France 0.038 0.052 0.034 0.005 34 15 23 21
Germany 0.014 0.029 0.021 0.007 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.017 0.026 0.031 0.012 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.036 0.044 0.019 0.011 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.035 0.082 0.034 0.012 34 10 24 19
Norway 0.012 0.025 0.033 0.027 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.030 0.034 0.041 0.013 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.014 0.042 0.020 0.007 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.034 0.039 0.039 0.014 34 21 26 21
United States 0.026 0.044 0.027 0.010 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.034 0.042 0.032 0.016 500 285 375 303
log I Argentina 0.147 0.140 0.123 0.094 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.161 0.134 0.124 0.066 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.097 0.233 0.070 0.060 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.060 0.084 0.073 0.073 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.056 0.108 0.107 0.107 34 21 26 21
France 0.081 0.293 0.045 0.046 34 15 23 21
Germany 0.072 0.348 0.065 0.056 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.260 0.160 0.232 0.065 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.058 0.117 0.060 0.042 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.153 0.226 0.050 0.050 34 19 24 19
Norway 0.048 0.220 0.067 0.068 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.110 0.100 0.089 0.048 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.084 0.100 0.041 0.076 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.050 0.070 0.081 0.079 34 21 26 21
United States 0.062 0.309 0.135 0.068 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.113 0.186 0.103 0.068 500 294 375 303
CA/Y Argentina 0.080 0.035 0.033 0.018 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.052 0.070 0.039 0.018 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.032 0.026 0.019 0.015 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.016 0.012 0.019 0.023 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.025 0.054 0.022 0.023 34 21 26 21
France 0.027 0.069 0.014 0.009 34 16 23 21
Germany 0.007 0.016 0.012 0.020 34 14 22 21
Italy 0.022 0.036 0.024 0.015 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.029 0.017 0.014 0.016 29 21 26 21
Netherlands 0.065 0.019 0.033 0.016 34 10 24 21
Norway 0.030 0.050 0.026 0.057 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.015 0.022 0.018 0.020 34 21 26 21
Sweden 0.021 0.023 0.014 0.016 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.023 0.025 0.014 0.019 34 21 26 21
United States 0.011 0.012 0.009 0.014 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.051 0.042 0.024 0.027 500 290 381 315
log P Argentina 0.093 0.057 0.114 0.609 30 21 26 23
Australia 0.023 0.030 0.026 0.019 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.026 0.044 0.019 0.015 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.024 0.068 0.017 0.014 34 21 26 21
Finland 0.034 0.055 0.048 0.020 34 21 26 21
France 0.043 0.083 0.031 0.016 34 18 24 21
Germany 0.019 2.918 0.022 0.017 34 21 26 21
Italy 0.014 0.052 0.055 0.024 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.038 0.060 0.092 0.026 29 21 22 18
Netherlands 0.021 0.047 0.020 0.012 34 21 26 21
Norway 0.020 0.069 0.026 0.015 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.025 0.061 0.036 0.019 34 21 26 21
Sweden 0.021 0.057 0.022 0.017 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.016 0.051 0.015 0.027 34 21 26 21
United States 0.013 0.045 0.019 0.018 34 21 26 21














































Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Persistence
log Y Argentina 0.107 0.386 0.036 0.097 29 21 26 23
Australia -0.183 0.001 0.343 0.133 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.121 0.265 0.064 0.227 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.280 0.310 -0.247 0.151 34 18 26 21
Finland 0.003 0.446 0.209 0.457 34 21 26 21
France -0.165 0.137 -0.029 0.247 33 17 22 21
Germany 0.144 0.473 0.028 0.284 34 13 21 18
Italy -0.465 0.009 -0.144 0.069 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.268 0.022 0.294 0.208 28 21 19 18
Netherlands -0.102 -0.030 -0.188 0.155 34 21 26 19
Norway 0.247 -0.259 -0.165 0.464 34 21 25 21
Spain -0.029 -0.128 0.183 0.138 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.083 0.128 0.036 0.293 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.337 0.367 0.122 0.328 34 21 26 21
United States 0.209 0.170 0.110 0.239 34 21 26 21
Pooled -0.062 0.185 -0.028 0.221 498 296 373 305
log C Argentina 0.158 0.100 0.105 0.218 28 21 26 21
Australia -0.318 -0.403 -0.146 -0.213 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.114 0.158 0.053 0.217 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.221 0.195 -0.133 0.000 34 18 26 21
Finland 0.170 -0.329 0.022 -0.175 34 21 26 21
France -0.140 0.018 0.021 0.265 33 14 22 21
Germany -0.064 0.456 -0.129 0.349 34 13 21 18
Italy -0.015 0.038 0.026 0.375 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.004 -0.015 -0.082 -0.179 28 21 19 18
Netherlands 0.027 0.906 0.119 0.235 34 9 23 19
Norway 0.195 -0.462 -0.347 0.377 34 21 25 21
Spain -0.190 -0.371 -0.001 -0.171 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.196 0.056 -0.109 -0.243 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.316 0.409 0.050 0.405 34 21 26 21
United States -0.012 0.003 0.104 0.338 34 21 26 21
Pooled -0.012 0.060 -0.008 0.199 497 281 370 303
log I Argentina 0.310 0.523 -0.018 0.230 28 21 26 21
Australia -0.381 -0.006 -0.125 -0.026 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.296 0.280 -0.077 0.100 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.414 0.251 -0.118 0.098 34 18 26 21
Finland 0.227 0.368 -0.199 0.325 34 21 26 21
France -0.285 0.092 0.161 -0.017 33 14 22 21
Germany 0.065 0.265 0.194 0.212 34 13 21 18
Italy -0.343 -0.163 -0.133 -0.185 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.018 0.089 0.102 0.312 28 21 19 18
Netherlands -0.137 0.201 0.212 0.103 34 18 23 19
Norway 0.258 -0.411 -0.310 0.217 34 21 25 21
Spain 0.148 0.115 0.260 0.402 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.018 0.287 -0.166 0.242 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.233 0.375 -0.210 0.237 34 21 26 21
United States -0.287 0.310 -0.207 0.139 34 21 26 21
Pooled -0.128 0.125 -0.093 0.176 497 290 370 303
CA/Y Argentina 0.643 0.460 0.332 0.442 28 21 26 21
Australia 0.734 -0.070 -0.166 0.639 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.906 0.724 0.722 0.787 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.381 0.504 0.160 0.707 34 18 26 21
Finland 0.463 0.564 0.237 0.598 34 21 26 21
France 0.864 0.785 0.181 0.154 34 15 22 21
Germany 0.389 0.030 0.573 0.722 34 13 21 21
Italy 0.802 0.911 0.654 0.347 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.214 0.597 0.434 0.749 28 21 25 21
Netherlands 0.564 0.616 0.502 0.557 34 9 23 21
Norway 0.875 0.514 0.407 0.719 34 21 25 21
Spain 0.434 0.439 0.628 0.644 34 21 26 21
Sweden 0.762 0.277 0.145 0.495 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.884 0.547 0.353 0.733 34 21 26 21
United States 0.870 0.788 0.448 0.839 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.835 0.565 0.395 0.774 498 286 376 315
log P Argentina 0.136 0.220 0.287 0.487 29 21 26 23
Australia 0.249 0.408 0.465 0.614 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.148 0.395 0.307 0.660 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.296 0.358 0.262 0.519 34 21 26 21
Finland 0.374 0.689 0.273 0.684 34 21 26 21
France -0.086 0.249 0.596 0.679 33 17 23 21
Germany 0.230 0.174 0.121 0.816 34 21 26 21
Italy 0.023 0.166 0.502 0.691 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.325 0.438 0.912 0.441 28 21 21 18
Netherlands 0.156 0.489 0.411 0.639 34 21 26 21
Norway 0.311 0.353 0.174 0.477 34 21 25 21
Spain -0.008 0.621 0.212 0.752 33 21 26 21
Sweden 0.371 0.774 0.213 0.471 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.125 0.444 0.282 0.513 34 21 26 21
United States 0.126 0.438 0.315 0.560 34 21 26 21









































Macroeconomic Aggregates, Comovement with Output
Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Comovement with Output
log C Argentina 0.858 0.633 0.614 0.825 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.672 0.348 0.540 -0.159 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.911 0.944 0.729 0.637 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.940 0.955 0.868 0.589 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.704 0.461 0.786 0.432 34 21 26 21
France 0.842 0.206 0.887 0.277 34 15 23 21
Germany 0.632 0.908 0.882 0.580 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.231 0.689 0.658 0.800 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.568 0.860 0.777 0.694 29 21 20 18
Netherlands -0.466 0.160 0.654 0.301 34 10 24 19
Norway 0.550 0.181 0.553 0.562 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.927 0.883 0.722 0.729 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.751 0.897 0.773 0.121 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.958 0.906 0.944 0.856 34 21 26 21
United States 0.865 0.894 0.655 0.833 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.650 0.664 0.727 0.613 500 285 375 303
log I Argentina 0.407 0.746 0.643 0.649 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.249 0.130 -0.367 0.855 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.644 0.714 0.066 0.882 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.860 0.730 0.613 0.890 34 19 26 21
Finland 0.443 0.770 -0.029 0.889 34 21 26 21
France 0.074 0.353 0.177 0.822 34 15 23 21
Germany 0.845 0.841 0.817 0.892 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.837 0.400 0.715 0.921 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.009 0.573 0.693 0.752 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.765 0.415 0.767 0.810 34 19 24 19
Norway 0.567 0.702 0.313 0.417 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.148 0.321 0.177 0.591 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.650 0.845 0.627 0.852 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.607 0.188 0.286 0.893 34 21 26 21
United States -0.098 0.163 0.187 0.961 34 21 26 21
Pooled 0.461 0.487 0.368 0.778 500 294 375 303
CA/Y Argentina -0.404 0.029 -0.188 -0.279 29 21 26 21
Australia -0.008 0.158 0.020 0.131 34 21 26 21
Canada -0.380 -0.071 -0.439 -0.187 34 21 26 21
Denmark -0.575 -0.112 -0.715 -0.214 34 19 26 21
Finland -0.057 -0.111 -0.113 -0.404 34 21 26 21
France 0.005 -0.422 0.005 -0.119 34 15 23 21
Germany -0.007 -0.493 -0.365 -0.164 34 14 22 18
Italy -0.146 0.317 -0.573 -0.596 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.186 -0.234 -0.266 -0.104 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.584 0.258 -0.641 -0.192 34 10 24 19
Norway -0.030 -0.214 -0.019 -0.257 34 21 26 21
Spain -0.242 -0.416 -0.340 -0.106 34 17 26 17
Sweden 0.063 -0.196 -0.136 -0.045 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.158 -0.018 -0.123 -0.502 34 21 26 21
United States 0.059 -0.373 -0.481 -0.188 34 21 26 21
Pooled -0.054 -0.073 -0.233 -0.175 500 285 375 303
log P Argentina -0.567 0.379 -0.626 -0.602 30 21 26 23
Australia 0.020 -0.085 -0.161 -0.456 34 21 26 21
Canada -0.013 0.467 0.183 -0.603 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.173 -0.384 -0.424 -0.725 34 19 26 21
Finland -0.481 -0.209 -0.280 -0.219 34 21 26 21
France -0.733 0.157 -0.211 -0.581 34 18 23 21
Germany -0.450 -0.079 -0.496 -0.539 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.315 -0.173 0.492 -0.190 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.507 -0.238 -0.108 -0.763 29 21 20 18
Netherlands -0.127 -0.004 0.111 -0.300 34 21 26 19
Norway 0.133 0.323 -0.127 -0.533 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.238 -0.094 0.329 -0.459 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.103 0.171 -0.413 -0.365 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.034 -0.289 -0.309 -0.711 34 21 26 21
United States -0.518 -0.601 -0.295 -0.578 34 21 26 21









































Macroeconomic Aggregates, Comovement with Country-Specific Output
Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Comovement with Output (Country-Specific Components)
log C Argentina 0.845 0.905 0.540 0.695 29 6 20 17
Australia 0.720 0.021 0.622 -0.074 29 6 20 17
Canada 0.923 0.951 0.796 0.646 29 6 20 17
Denmark 0.887 0.753 0.503 0.586 29 6 20 17
Finland 0.600 0.856 0.768 0.486 29 6 20 17
France 0.813 0.343 0.785 0.739 29 6 20 17
Germany 0.346 0.809 0.621 0.272 29 6 20 17
Italy 0.446 0.816 0.779 0.790 29 6 20 17
Japan 0.622 0.900 0.733 0.730 29 6 20 17
Netherlands -0.398 0.572 0.780 0.420 29 6 20 17
Norway 0.608 -0.716 0.527 0.553 29 6 20 17
Spain 0.909 0.955 0.699 0.762 29 6 20 17
Sweden 0.698 0.888 0.809 0.218 29 6 20 17
United Kingdom 0.946 0.745 0.978 0.783 29 6 20 17
United States 0.868 0.890 0.590 0.744 29 6 20 17
Pooled 0.632 0.493 0.683 0.586 435 90 300 255
log I Argentina 0.413 0.505 0.534 0.473 29 11 20 17
Australia 0.159 0.584 0.214 0.756 29 11 20 17
Canada 0.513 0.845 0.697 0.820 29 11 20 17
Denmark 0.551 0.776 0.656 0.886 29 11 20 17
Finland 0.215 0.175 -0.004 0.869 29 11 20 17
France 0.022 0.159 0.018 0.746 29 11 20 17
Germany 0.793 0.753 0.731 0.771 29 11 20 17
Italy 0.776 0.962 0.664 0.864 29 11 20 17
Japan 0.167 0.209 0.580 0.763 29 11 20 17
Netherlands 0.828 0.346 0.704 0.437 29 11 20 17
Norway 0.412 0.810 0.233 0.583 29 11 20 17
Spain 0.013 0.328 0.439 0.672 29 11 20 17
Sweden 0.565 0.264 0.674 0.816 29 11 20 17
United Kingdom 0.476 -0.220 0.764 0.871 29 11 20 17
United States 0.230 -0.264 0.775 0.964 29 11 20 17
Pooled 0.431 0.421 0.474 0.707 435 165 300 255
CA/Y Argentina -0.426 -0.006 -0.209 -0.195 29 6 20 17
Australia -0.049 0.880 0.093 -0.012 29 6 20 17
Canada -0.295 -0.236 -0.165 -0.678 29 6 20 17
Denmark -0.436 -0.576 -0.416 -0.543 29 6 20 17
Finland 0.134 0.447 -0.204 -0.781 29 6 20 17
France 0.105 0.244 -0.085 -0.400 29 6 20 17
Germany 0.217 -0.020 -0.201 -0.575 29 6 20 17
Italy -0.200 -0.330 -0.327 -0.558 29 6 20 17
Japan 0.091 -0.788 -0.199 -0.250 29 6 20 17
Netherlands 0.620 -0.048 -0.414 -0.063 29 6 20 17
Norway -0.064 0.523 -0.155 -0.181 29 6 20 17
Spain -0.293 -0.777 -0.672 -0.343 29 6 20 17
Sweden 0.042 0.519 -0.059 -0.016 29 6 20 17
United Kingdom -0.315 0.515 -0.413 -0.538 29 6 20 17
United States -0.083 -0.442 -0.152 -0.449 29 6 20 17
Pooled -0.047 0.178 -0.151 -0.252 435 90 300 255
log P Argentina -0.581 0.250 -0.645 -0.483 29 11 20 17
Australia 0.011 0.173 -0.753 0.013 29 11 20 17
Canada -0.140 0.409 -0.565 -0.092 29 11 20 17
Denmark -0.067 0.197 -0.539 -0.553 29 11 20 17
Finland -0.599 0.206 -0.619 0.259 29 11 20 17
France -0.709 0.234 0.044 -0.087 29 11 20 17
Germany -0.205 -0.119 -0.040 -0.381 29 11 20 17
Italy -0.144 -0.060 -0.386 0.323 29 11 20 17
Japan -0.648 -0.434 0.334 -0.597 29 11 20 17
Netherlands -0.176 -0.106 0.536 -0.706 29 11 20 17
Norway -0.137 0.114 -0.023 -0.214 29 11 20 17
Spain 0.110 0.326 0.208 -0.119 29 11 20 17
Sweden -0.315 -0.270 -0.263 -0.040 29 11 20 17
United Kingdom -0.097 -0.618 -0.139 -0.195 29 11 20 17
United States -0.625 -0.246 -0.687 -0.393 29 11 20 17













































Macroeconomic Aggregates, Comovement with U.S.
Statistic Sample Size Chart
Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br. Gold Inter- Br.
Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float Std. war Woods Float
Comovement with U.S.
log C Argentina 0.013 -0.330 -0.181 -0.021 29 21 26 21
Australia -0.085 0.117 0.343 0.067 34 21 26 21
Canada -0.215 -0.264 0.506 0.622 34 21 26 21
Denmark -0.028 -0.173 -0.474 0.152 34 19 26 21
Finland -0.134 -0.260 -0.019 -0.080 34 21 26 21
France 0.099 0.029 0.255 -0.318 34 15 23 21
Germany -0.130 0.114 -0.120 0.174 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.352 0.581 0.068 -0.056 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.253 -0.120 0.143 0.199 29 21 20 18
Netherlands 0.097 -0.056 -0.150 0.142 34 10 24 19
Norway 0.091 -0.019 -0.019 0.332 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.184 -0.259 -0.273 0.104 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.094 -0.828 -0.440 -0.169 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.200 0.319 0.353 0.543 34 21 26 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.084 -0.008 0.035 0.150 500 285 375 303
log I Argentina -0.068 0.722 0.169 -0.306 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.123 0.311 0.540 0.501 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.082 0.746 0.645 0.487 34 21 26 21
Denmark -0.101 0.516 0.395 0.493 34 19 26 21
Finland -0.093 0.285 -0.694 -0.102 34 21 26 21
France -0.137 0.275 -0.104 0.254 34 15 23 21
Germany -0.157 0.331 0.323 0.590 34 14 22 18
Italy 0.378 0.148 0.575 0.315 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.153 0.309 -0.242 0.529 29 21 20 18
Netherlands -0.053 0.501 0.302 0.575 34 19 24 19
Norway -0.173 0.196 -0.343 -0.183 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.108 0.224 -0.172 -0.354 34 17 26 17
Sweden -0.061 0.518 0.199 -0.154 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.023 0.461 0.577 0.575 34 21 26 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.074 0.427 0.276 0.237 500 294 375 303
CA/Y Argentina 0.630 -0.010 0.338 0.295 29 21 26 21
Australia 0.180 -0.232 0.236 0.618 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.239 -0.151 0.392 0.075 34 21 26 21
Denmark -0.265 -0.004 -0.377 0.114 34 19 26 21
Finland -0.086 -0.833 0.250 -0.262 34 21 26 21
France 0.423 -0.356 -0.190 0.025 34 16 23 21
Germany -0.314 -0.222 -0.294 -0.671 34 14 22 21
Italy 0.690 -0.863 -0.613 -0.205 34 21 26 21
Japan -0.227 0.150 -0.361 -0.843 29 21 26 21
Netherlands -0.472 -0.068 -0.445 -0.172 34 10 24 21
Norway -0.719 -0.869 -0.575 -0.165 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.113 0.530 -0.002 -0.473 34 21 26 21
Sweden 0.151 -0.818 -0.707 -0.180 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom -0.544 0.389 -0.694 0.117 34 21 26 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.033 -0.266 -0.104 -0.058 500 290 381 315
log P Argentina -0.091 0.729 -0.017 -0.005 30 21 26 21
Australia 0.035 0.767 0.255 0.365 34 21 26 21
Canada 0.511 0.980 0.696 0.757 34 21 26 21
Denmark 0.150 0.763 0.253 0.746 34 21 26 21
Finland 0.200 0.212 0.601 0.523 34 21 26 21
France -0.045 0.469 0.718 0.717 34 18 24 21
Germany 0.006 -0.027 0.438 0.153 34 21 26 21
Italy 0.296 0.333 0.610 0.648 34 21 26 21
Japan 0.116 0.458 -0.203 0.614 29 21 22 18
Netherlands 0.362 0.848 0.010 0.403 34 21 26 21
Norway 0.104 0.718 0.294 0.281 34 21 26 21
Spain 0.334 0.719 0.497 0.168 34 21 26 21
Sweden 0.191 0.777 0.557 0.507 34 21 26 21
United Kingdom 0.359 0.834 0.561 0.699 34 21 26 21
United States ———— ————
Pooled 0.128 0.038 0.241 0.055 501 312 384 312
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